debmon/openssl1.0
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Projects Releases Wiki Activity
6aa3750790
openssl1.0/ssl/ssl_lib.c
Mario Fetka 33f8b6874c Imported Upstream version 1.0.2s
2019-08-09 10:00:55 +02:00

3596 lines
104 KiB
C
Raw Blame History

/*
* ! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c \brief Version independent SSL functions.
*/
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
#ifdef REF_CHECK
# include <assert.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "kssl_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
# include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
# include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
const char *SSL_version_str = OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = {
/*
* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library
* bug
*/
(int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
ssl_undefined_function,
(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))
ssl_undefined_function,
(int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
(int (*)(SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *))
ssl_undefined_function,
0, /* finish_mac_length */
(int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
NULL, /* client_finished_label */
0, /* client_finished_label_len */
NULL, /* server_finished_label */
0, /* server_finished_label_len */
(int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function,
(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *,
size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t,
int use_context))ssl_undefined_function,
};
int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
{
if (s->method == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
return (0);
}
if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) {
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = NULL;
}
s->error = 0;
s->hit = 0;
s->shutdown = 0;
#if 0
/*
* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
* needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation)
*/
/*
* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
* the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-)
*/
if (s->renegotiate)
return (1);
#else
if (s->renegotiate) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
#endif
s->type = 0;
s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | ((s->server) ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT);
s->version = s->method->version;
s->client_version = s->version;
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
#if 0
s->read_ahead = s->ctx->read_ahead;
#endif
if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf = NULL;
}
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
s->first_packet = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->cert != NULL) {
if (s->cert->alpn_proposed) {
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed);
s->cert->alpn_proposed = NULL;
}
s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
s->cert->alpn_sent = 0;
}
#endif
#if 1
/*
* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if so, revert
* back if we are not doing session-id reuse.
*/
if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL)
&& (s->method != s->ctx->method)) {
s->method->ssl_free(s);
s->method = s->ctx->method;
if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
return (0);
} else
#endif
s->method->ssl_clear(s);
return (1);
}
/** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */
int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
ctx->method = meth;
sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &(ctx->cipher_list),
&(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
meth->version ==
SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" :
SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert);
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,
SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
return (0);
}
return (1);
}
SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
SSL *s;
if (ctx == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
return (NULL);
}
if (ctx->method == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
return (NULL);
}
s = (SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
if (s == NULL)
goto err;
memset(s, 0, sizeof(SSL));
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
s->options = ctx->options;
s->mode = ctx->mode;
s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list;
s->references = 1;
if (ctx->cert != NULL) {
/*
* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to the CERT, not
* its contents; only when setting new parameters for the per-SSL
* copy, ssl_cert_new would be called (and the direct reference to
* the per-SSL_CTX settings would be lost, but those still were
* indirectly accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they
* used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). Now we don't look at the
* SSL_CTX's CERT after having duplicated it once.
*/
s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
if (s->cert == NULL)
goto err;
} else
s->cert = NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */
s->read_ahead = ctx->read_ahead;
s->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback;
s->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg;
s->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode;
#if 0
s->verify_depth = ctx->verify_depth;
#endif
s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback;
s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id;
s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
if (!s->param)
goto err;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
#if 0
s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
s->trust = ctx->trust;
#endif
s->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown;
s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
s->ctx = ctx;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0;
s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL;
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL;
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
s->initial_ctx = ctx;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
if (!s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
goto err;
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
}
if (ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
if (!s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
goto err;
s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
}
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
# endif
if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) {
s->alpn_client_proto_list =
OPENSSL_malloc(s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
goto err;
memcpy(s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list,
s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
s->alpn_client_proto_list_len = s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
}
#endif
s->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
s->method = ctx->method;
if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
goto err;
s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1;
SSL_clear(s);
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
s->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback;
s->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback;
#endif
return (s);
err:
if (s != NULL)
SSL_free(s);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (NULL);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
{
if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof(ctx->sid_ctx)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
{
if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
{
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
{
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
return 1;
}
int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
unsigned int id_len)
{
/*
* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
* we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to
* find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
* any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use
* by this SSL.
*/
SSL_SESSION r, *p;
if (id_len > sizeof(r.session_id))
return 0;
r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
r.session_id_length = id_len;
memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
/*
* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a
* callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it
* must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be
* converted to when the callback has finished choosing it.
*/
if ((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) &&
(id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0, SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len);
r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
}
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
return (p != NULL);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
}
int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
}
int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
}
int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
}
int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
}
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->param;
}
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl)
{
return ssl->param;
}
void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *s)
{
ssl_cert_clear_certs(s->cert);
}
void SSL_free(SSL *s)
{
int i;
if (s == NULL)
return;
i = CRYPTO_add(&s->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
REF_PRINT("SSL", s);
#endif
if (i > 0)
return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
if (i < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "SSL_free, bad reference count\n");
abort(); /* ok */
}
#endif
if (s->param)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
if (s->bbio != NULL) {
/* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */
if (s->bbio == s->wbio) {
s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
}
BIO_free(s->bbio);
s->bbio = NULL;
}
if (s->rbio != NULL)
BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio))
BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
if (s->init_buf != NULL)
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
/* add extra stuff */
if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
/* Make the next call work :-) */
if (s->session != NULL) {
ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
}
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
if (s->cert != NULL)
ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
/* Free up if allocated */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_hostname)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
if (s->initial_ctx)
SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids)
sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
if (s->alpn_client_proto_list)
OPENSSL_free(s->alpn_client_proto_list);
#endif
if (s->client_CA != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
if (s->method != NULL)
s->method->ssl_free(s);
if (s->ctx)
SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL)
kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if (s->srtp_profiles)
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);
#endif
OPENSSL_free(s);
}
void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio)
{
/*
* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
*/
if (s->bbio != NULL) {
if (s->wbio == s->bbio) {
s->wbio = s->wbio->next_bio;
s->bbio->next_bio = NULL;
}
}
if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio))
BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio))
BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
s->rbio = rbio;
s->wbio = wbio;
}
BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s)
{
return (s->rbio);
}
BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s)
{
return (s->wbio);
}
int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s)
{
return (SSL_get_rfd(s));
}
int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s)
{
int ret = -1;
BIO *b, *r;
b = SSL_get_rbio(s);
r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
if (r != NULL)
BIO_get_fd(r, &ret);
return (ret);
}
int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s)
{
int ret = -1;
BIO *b, *r;
b = SSL_get_wbio(s);
r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
if (r != NULL)
BIO_get_fd(r, &ret);
return (ret);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd)
{
int ret = 0;
BIO *bio = NULL;
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
if (bio == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio);
ret = 1;
err:
return (ret);
}
int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd)
{
int ret = 0;
BIO *bio = NULL;
if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
|| ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio, NULL) != fd)) {
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
if (bio == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), bio);
} else
SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), SSL_get_rbio(s));
ret = 1;
err:
return (ret);
}
int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd)
{
int ret = 0;
BIO *bio = NULL;
if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
|| ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio, NULL) != fd)) {
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
if (bio == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
SSL_set_bio(s, bio, SSL_get_wbio(s));
} else
SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_wbio(s), SSL_get_wbio(s));
ret = 1;
err:
return (ret);
}
#endif
/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */
size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
{
size_t ret = 0;
if (s->s3 != NULL) {
ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
if (count > ret)
count = ret;
memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
}
return ret;
}
/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */
size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
{
size_t ret = 0;
if (s->s3 != NULL) {
ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
if (count > ret)
count = ret;
memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
}
return ret;
}
int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s)
{
return (s->verify_mode);
}
int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param);
}
int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
return (s->verify_callback);
}
int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return (ctx->verify_mode);
}
int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
}
int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
return (ctx->default_verify_callback);
}
void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode,
int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))
{
s->verify_mode = mode;
if (callback != NULL)
s->verify_callback = callback;
}
void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
}
void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes)
{
s->read_ahead = yes;
}
int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s)
{
return (s->read_ahead);
}
int SSL_pending(const SSL *s)
{
/*
* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled
* (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), and it is
* impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report errors that may be
* observed while scanning the new data. (Note that SSL_pending() is
* often used as a boolean value, so we'd better not return -1.)
*/
return (s->method->ssl_pending(s));
}
X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s)
{
X509 *r;
if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
r = NULL;
else
r = s->session->peer;
if (r == NULL)
return (r);
CRYPTO_add(&r->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
return (r);
}
STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *r;
if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)
|| (s->session->sess_cert == NULL))
r = NULL;
else
r = s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain;
/*
* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own certificate; if
* we are a server, it does not.
*/
return (r);
}
/*
* Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to
* modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled
*/
void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f)
{
CERT *tmp;
/* Do we need to to SSL locking? */
SSL_set_session(t, SSL_get_session(f));
/*
* what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or vice-versa
*/
if (t->method != f->method) {
t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */
t->method = f->method; /* change method */
t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */
}
tmp = t->cert;
if (f->cert != NULL) {
CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
t->cert = f->cert;
} else
t->cert = NULL;
if (tmp != NULL)
ssl_cert_free(tmp);
SSL_set_session_id_context(t, f->sid_ctx, f->sid_ctx_length);
}
/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */
int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
if ((ctx == NULL) ||
(ctx->cert == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
return (0);
}
if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
return (0);
}
return (X509_check_private_key
(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey));
}
/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
{
if (ssl == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return (0);
}
if (ssl->cert == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
return 0;
}
if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
return (0);
}
if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
return (0);
}
return (X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509,
ssl->cert->key->privatekey));
}
int SSL_accept(SSL *s)
{
if (s->handshake_func == 0)
/* Not properly initialized yet */
SSL_set_accept_state(s);
return (s->method->ssl_accept(s));
}
int SSL_connect(SSL *s)
{
if (s->handshake_func == 0)
/* Not properly initialized yet */
SSL_set_connect_state(s);
return (s->method->ssl_connect(s));
}
long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s)
{
return (s->method->get_timeout());
}
int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
{
if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
return (0);
}
return (s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num));
}
int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
{
if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
return (0);
}
return (s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num));
}
int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num)
{
if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) {
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
return (-1);
}
return (s->method->ssl_write(s, buf, num));
}
int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
{
/*
* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might
* expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), 1 for success; but
* calling it once is usually not enough, even if blocking I/O is used
* (see ssl3_shutdown).
*/
if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (!SSL_in_init(s)) {
return s->method->ssl_shutdown(s);
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT);
return -1;
}
}
int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
{
if (s->renegotiate == 0)
s->renegotiate = 1;
s->new_session = 1;
return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
}
int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s)
{
if (s->renegotiate == 0)
s->renegotiate = 1;
s->new_session = 0;
return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
}
int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s)
{
/*
* becomes true when negotiation is requested; false again once a
* handshake has finished
*/
return (s->renegotiate != 0);
}
long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
{
long l;
switch (cmd) {
case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
return (s->read_ahead);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
l = s->read_ahead;
s->read_ahead = larg;
return (l);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
return 1;
case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
return (s->options |= larg);
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
return (s->options &= ~larg);
case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
return (s->mode |= larg);
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
return (s->mode &= ~larg);
case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
return (s->max_cert_list);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
l = s->max_cert_list;
s->max_cert_list = larg;
return (l);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
return 0;
s->max_send_fragment = larg;
return 1;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
if (s->s3)
return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
else
return 0;
case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS:
return (s->cert->cert_flags |= larg);
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS:
return (s->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg);
case SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST:
if (parg) {
if (s->cert->ciphers_raw == NULL)
return 0;
*(unsigned char **)parg = s->cert->ciphers_raw;
return (int)s->cert->ciphers_rawlen;
} else
return ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
default:
return (s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg));
}
}
long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
{
switch (cmd) {
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
s->msg_callback = (void (*)
(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
void *arg))(fp);
return 1;
default:
return (s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s, cmd, fp));
}
}
LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->sessions;
}
long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
{
long l;
/* For some cases with ctx == NULL perform syntax checks */
if (ctx == NULL) {
switch (cmd) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST:
return tls1_set_curves_list(NULL, NULL, parg);
#endif
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST:
case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST:
return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(NULL, parg, 0);
default:
return 0;
}
}
switch (cmd) {
case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
return (ctx->read_ahead);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
l = ctx->read_ahead;
ctx->read_ahead = larg;
return (l);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
return 1;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
return (ctx->max_cert_list);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
l = ctx->max_cert_list;
ctx->max_cert_list = larg;
return (l);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
l = ctx->session_cache_size;
ctx->session_cache_size = larg;
return (l);
case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
return (ctx->session_cache_size);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
l = ctx->session_cache_mode;
ctx->session_cache_mode = larg;
return (l);
case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
return (ctx->session_cache_mode);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
return (lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions));
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
return (ctx->stats.sess_connect);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE:
return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT:
return (ctx->stats.sess_accept);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD:
return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE:
return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT:
return (ctx->stats.sess_hit);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT:
return (ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES:
return (ctx->stats.sess_miss);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS:
return (ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
return (ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
return (ctx->options |= larg);
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
return (ctx->options &= ~larg);
case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
return (ctx->mode |= larg);
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
return (ctx->mode &= ~larg);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
return 0;
ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
return 1;
case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS:
return (ctx->cert->cert_flags |= larg);
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS:
return (ctx->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg);
default:
return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx, cmd, larg, parg));
}
}
long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
{
switch (cmd) {
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)
(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
void *arg))(fp);
return 1;
default:
return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, cmd, fp));
}
}
int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b)
{
long l;
l = a->id - b->id;
if (l == 0L)
return (0);
else
return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1);
}
int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap,
const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp)
{
long l;
l = (*ap)->id - (*bp)->id;
if (l == 0L)
return (0);
else
return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1);
}
/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
* preference */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s)
{
if (s != NULL) {
if (s->cipher_list != NULL) {
return (s->cipher_list);
} else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) {
return (s->ctx->cipher_list);
}
}
return (NULL);
}
/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
* algorithm id */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
{
if (s != NULL) {
if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) {
return (s->cipher_list_by_id);
} else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) {
return (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
}
}
return (NULL);
}
/** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */
const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n)
{
SSL_CIPHER *c;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
if (s == NULL)
return (NULL);
sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n))
return (NULL);
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n);
if (c == NULL)
return (NULL);
return (c->name);
}
/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list,
&ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str, ctx->cert);
/*
* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it was unable to
* find a cipher matching the given rule string (for example if the rule
* string specifies a cipher which has been disabled). This is not an
* error as far as ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
* ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been updated.
*/
if (sk == NULL)
return 0;
else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method, &s->cipher_list,
&s->cipher_list_by_id, str, s->cert);
/* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
if (sk == NULL)
return 0;
else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */
char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int size)
{
char *p;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clntsk, *srvrsk;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
int i;
if (!s->server
|| s->session == NULL
|| s->session->ciphers == NULL
|| size < 2)
return NULL;
p = buf;
clntsk = s->session->ciphers;
srvrsk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
if (clntsk == NULL || srvrsk == NULL)
return NULL;
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clntsk) == 0 || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvrsk) == 0)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clntsk); i++) {
int n;
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clntsk, i);
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(srvrsk, c) < 0)
continue;
n = strlen(c->name);
if (n + 1 > size) {
if (p != buf)
--p;
*p = '\0';
return buf;
}
strcpy(p, c->name);
p += n;
*(p++) = ':';
size -= n + 1;
}
p[-1] = '\0';
return (buf);
}
int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
unsigned char *p,
int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *,
unsigned char *))
{
int i, j = 0;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
CERT *ct = s->cert;
unsigned char *q;
int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
/* Set disabled masks for this session */
ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
if (sk == NULL)
return (0);
q = p;
if (put_cb == NULL)
put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
/* Skip disabled ciphers */
if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl ||
c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
continue;
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv)
continue;
else
empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0;
}
#endif
j = put_cb(c, p);
p += j;
}
/*
* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
* applicable SCSVs.
*/
if (p != q) {
if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
p += j;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr,
"TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
#endif
}
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
p += j;
}
}
return (p - q);
}
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
int num,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp)
{
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
int i, n;
if (s->s3)
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
n = ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
if (n == 0 || (num % n) != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
return (NULL);
}
if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
if(sk == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
} else {
sk = *skp;
sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
}
if (s->cert->ciphers_raw)
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ciphers_raw);
s->cert->ciphers_raw = BUF_memdup(p, num);
if (s->cert->ciphers_raw == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
s->cert->ciphers_rawlen = (size_t)num;
for (i = 0; i < num; i += n) {
/* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
(p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
(p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
/* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
if (s->renegotiate) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
p += n;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
#endif
continue;
}
/* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
(p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
(p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
/*
* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
* version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
* downgrade.
*/
if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
if (s->s3)
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
goto err;
}
p += n;
continue;
}
c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
p += n;
if (c != NULL) {
if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
}
if (skp != NULL)
*skp = sk;
return (sk);
err:
if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
return (NULL);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL.
* So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546).
*/
const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type)
{
if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
return NULL;
return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ?
s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname;
}
int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->session
&& (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->
tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname))
return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
return -1;
}
/*
* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
* expected that this function is called from the callback set by
* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. The protocol data is assumed to be a
* vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte strings. The length byte itself is
* not included in the length. A byte string of length 0 is invalid. No byte
* string may be truncated. The current, but experimental algorithm for
* selecting the protocol is: 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this
* is indicated to the callback. In this case, the client application has to
* abort the connection or have a default application level protocol. 2) If
* the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the client
* selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the API that this
* fallback case was enacted. 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first
* protocol in the server's list that it supports and selects this protocol.
* This is because it's assumed that the server has better information about
* which protocol a client should use. 4) If the client doesn't support any
* of the server's advertised protocols, then this is treated the same as
* case 2. It returns either OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was
* found, or OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
*/
int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
const unsigned char *server,
unsigned int server_len,
const unsigned char *client,
unsigned int client_len)
{
unsigned int i, j;
const unsigned char *result;
int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
/*
* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
*/
for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
if (server[i] == client[j] &&
memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
/* We found a match */
result = &server[i];
status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
goto found;
}
j += client[j];
j++;
}
i += server[i];
i++;
}
/* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
result = client;
status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
found:
*out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
*outlen = result[0];
return status;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the
* client's requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the
* client didn't request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. Note that
* the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned from
* this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
* provided by the callback.
*/
void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
unsigned *len)
{
*data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
if (!*data) {
*len = 0;
} else {
*len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
}
}
/*
* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when
* a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
* Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is
* returned by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This
* memory will not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a
* reference to it. The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it
* wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the
* ServerHello.
*/
void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
const unsigned char
**out,
unsigned int *outlen,
void *arg), void *arg)
{
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
}
/*
* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
* client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
* must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
* The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The
* server's advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The
* callback can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. The client must
* select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
* a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
*/
void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
unsigned char *outlen,
const unsigned char *in,
unsigned int inlen,
void *arg), void *arg)
{
ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
}
# endif
/*
* SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to |protos|.
* |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
* length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success.
*/
int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos,
unsigned protos_len)
{
if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list)
OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list);
ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(protos_len);
if (!ctx->alpn_client_proto_list)
return 1;
memcpy(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len);
ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
return 0;
}
/*
* SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|.
* |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
* length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success.
*/
int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos,
unsigned protos_len)
{
if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list)
OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list);
ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(protos_len);
if (!ssl->alpn_client_proto_list)
return 1;
memcpy(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len);
ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
return 0;
}
/*
* SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is
* called during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol
* from the client's list of offered protocols.
*/
void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
const unsigned char **out,
unsigned char *outlen,
const unsigned char *in,
unsigned int inlen,
void *arg), void *arg)
{
ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb;
ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg;
}
/*
* SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from
* |ssl|. On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name
* (not including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't
* respond with a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero.
*/
void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data,
unsigned *len)
{
*data = NULL;
if (ssl->s3)
*data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected;
if (*data == NULL)
*len = 0;
else
*len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
const char *label, size_t llen,
const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen,
int use_context)
{
if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
return -1;
return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label,
llen, context,
contextlen, use_context);
}
static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
{
const unsigned char *session_id = a->session_id;
unsigned long l;
unsigned char tmp_storage[4];
if (a->session_id_length < sizeof(tmp_storage)) {
memset(tmp_storage, 0, sizeof(tmp_storage));
memcpy(tmp_storage, a->session_id, a->session_id_length);
session_id = tmp_storage;
}
l = (unsigned long)
((unsigned long)session_id[0]) |
((unsigned long)session_id[1] << 8L) |
((unsigned long)session_id[2] << 16L) |
((unsigned long)session_id[3] << 24L);
return (l);
}
/*
* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
* coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
* SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on
* being able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing
* session with a matching session ID.
*/
static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b)
{
if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
return (1);
if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
return (1);
return (memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length));
}
/*
* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring
* SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each
* variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed
* via ssl.h.
*/
static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
{
SSL_CTX *ret = NULL;
if (meth == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
return (NULL);
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
return NULL;
}
#endif
if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
goto err;
}
ret = (SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX));
ret->method = meth;
ret->cert_store = NULL;
ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
ret->session_cache_head = NULL;
ret->session_cache_tail = NULL;
/* We take the system default */
ret->session_timeout = meth->get_timeout();
ret->new_session_cb = 0;
ret->remove_session_cb = 0;
ret->get_session_cb = 0;
ret->generate_session_id = 0;
memset((char *)&ret->stats, 0, sizeof(ret->stats));
ret->references = 1;
ret->quiet_shutdown = 0;
/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/
/*-
ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
ret->master_key=NULL;
ret->key_arg=NULL;
ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
ret->info_callback = NULL;
ret->app_verify_callback = 0;
ret->app_verify_arg = NULL;
ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
ret->read_ahead = 0;
ret->msg_callback = 0;
ret->msg_callback_arg = NULL;
ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
#if 0
ret->verify_depth = -1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */
#endif
ret->sid_ctx_length = 0;
ret->default_verify_callback = NULL;
if ((ret->cert = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
ret->default_passwd_callback = 0;
ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata = NULL;
ret->client_cert_cb = 0;
ret->app_gen_cookie_cb = 0;
ret->app_verify_cookie_cb = 0;
ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new();
if (ret->sessions == NULL)
goto err;
ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new();
if (ret->cert_store == NULL)
goto err;
ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
&ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id,
meth->version ==
SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST,
ret->cert);
if (ret->cipher_list == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
goto err2;
}
ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
if (!ret->param)
goto err;
if ((ret->rsa_md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES);
goto err2;
}
if ((ret->md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES);
goto err2;
}
if ((ret->sha1 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES);
goto err2;
}
if ((ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
goto err;
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
ret->extra_certs = NULL;
/* No compression for DTLS */
if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS))
ret->comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0;
ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL;
/* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
if ((RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
|| (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0)
|| (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0))
ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
# endif
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
ret->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
ret->psk_client_callback = NULL;
ret->psk_server_callback = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT;
ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
if (!ret->rbuf_freelist)
goto err;
ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0;
ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
if (!ret->wbuf_freelist)
goto err;
ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0;
ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ret->client_cert_engine = NULL;
# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
# define eng_strx(x) #x
# define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x)
/* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */
{
ENGINE *eng;
eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
if (!eng) {
ERR_clear_error();
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
}
if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng))
ERR_clear_error();
}
# endif
#endif
/*
* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely
* deployed might change this.
*/
ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
/*
* Disable SSLv2 by default, callers that want to enable SSLv2 will have to
* explicitly clear this option via either of SSL_CTX_clear_options() or
* SSL_clear_options().
*/
ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
return (ret);
err:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err2:
if (ret != NULL)
SSL_CTX_free(ret);
return (NULL);
}
#if 0
static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp)
{
OPENSSL_free(comp);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
static void ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list)
{
SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next;
for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next) {
next = ent->next;
OPENSSL_free(ent);
}
OPENSSL_free(list);
}
#endif
void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
{
int i;
if (a == NULL)
return;
i = CRYPTO_add(&a->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX", a);
#endif
if (i > 0)
return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
if (i < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n");
abort(); /* ok */
}
#endif
if (a->param)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
/*
* Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
* the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed
* after the sessions were flushed.
* As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
* the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
* free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
* (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
*/
if (a->sessions != NULL)
SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a, 0);
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
if (a->sessions != NULL)
lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
if (a->cert_store != NULL)
X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
if (a->cipher_list != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list);
if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
if (a->cert != NULL)
ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
if (a->client_CA != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
if (a->extra_certs != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs, X509_free);
#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it
* removes a global database */
if (a->comp_methods != NULL)
sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods, SSL_COMP_free);
#else
a->comp_methods = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if (a->srtp_profiles)
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (a->psk_identity_hint)
OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (a->client_cert_engine)
ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
if (a->wbuf_freelist)
ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist);
if (a->rbuf_freelist)
ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
if (a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (a->alpn_client_proto_list != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(a->alpn_client_proto_list);
#endif
OPENSSL_free(a);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb)
{
ctx->default_passwd_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u)
{
ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *),
void *arg)
{
ctx->app_verify_callback = cb;
ctx->app_verify_arg = arg;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
{
ctx->verify_mode = mode;
ctx->default_verify_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg),
void *arg)
{
ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(c->cert, cb, arg);
}
void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
{
ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(s->cert, cb, arg);
}
void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk;
int rsa_enc, rsa_tmp, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dh_rsa, dh_dsa, dsa_sign;
int rsa_enc_export, dh_rsa_export, dh_dsa_export;
int rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp_export, kl;
unsigned long mask_k, mask_a, emask_k, emask_a;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
int have_ecdh_tmp, ecdh_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
X509 *x = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0;
#endif
if (c == NULL)
return;
kl = SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
rsa_tmp = (c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL);
rsa_tmp_export = (c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL ||
(rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp) * 8 <= kl));
#else
rsa_tmp = rsa_tmp_export = 0;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL);
dh_tmp_export = (c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL ||
(dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp) * 8 <= kl));
#else
dh_tmp = dh_tmp_export = 0;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
have_ecdh_tmp = (c->ecdh_tmp || c->ecdh_tmp_cb || c->ecdh_tmp_auto);
#endif
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
rsa_enc = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
rsa_enc_export = (rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]);
rsa_sign = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]);
dsa_sign = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]);
dh_rsa = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
dh_rsa_export = (dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]);
/* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */
dh_dsa = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
dh_dsa_export = (dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
have_ecc_cert = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
#endif
mask_k = 0;
mask_a = 0;
emask_k = 0;
emask_a = 0;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr,
"rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
rsa_tmp, rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp, have_ecdh_tmp, rsa_enc,
rsa_enc_export, rsa_sign, dsa_sign, dh_rsa, dh_dsa);
#endif
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]);
if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
}
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]);
if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94;
}
if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign))
mask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc)))
emask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
#if 0
/* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */
if ((dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) && (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
mask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) &&
(rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
emask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
#endif
if (dh_tmp_export)
emask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
if (dh_tmp)
mask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
if (dh_rsa)
mask_k |= SSL_kDHr;
if (dh_rsa_export)
emask_k |= SSL_kDHr;
if (dh_dsa)
mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
if (dh_dsa_export)
emask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
if (mask_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd))
mask_a |= SSL_aDH;
if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) {
mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
emask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
}
if (dsa_sign) {
mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
emask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
}
mask_a |= SSL_aNULL;
emask_a |= SSL_aNULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
emask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
emask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
#endif
/*
* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or ECDSA cipher suites
* depending on the key usage extension.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (have_ecc_cert) {
cpk = &c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC];
x = cpk->x509;
/* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
(x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1;
# endif
ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
(x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
if (!(cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN))
ecdsa_ok = 0;
ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
# endif
EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) {
signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (ecdh_ok) {
if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa) {
mask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
mask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) {
emask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
emask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
}
}
if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) {
mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
mask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) {
emask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
emask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
}
}
}
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
if (ecdsa_ok) {
mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
emask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
}
# endif
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (have_ecdh_tmp) {
mask_k |= SSL_kEECDH;
emask_k |= SSL_kEECDH;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
emask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
emask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
#endif
c->mask_k = mask_k;
c->mask_a = mask_a;
c->export_mask_k = emask_k;
c->export_mask_a = emask_a;
c->valid = 1;
}
/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */
#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
{
unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int keysize = 0;
int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs)) {
/* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
if (pkey == NULL)
return 0;
keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (keysize > 163)
return 0;
}
/* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) {
signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) {
/* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
return 0;
}
if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
/* signature alg must be ECDSA */
if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE);
return 0;
}
}
if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
/* signature alg must be RSA */
if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE);
return 0;
}
}
}
if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
/* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
return 0;
}
}
return 1; /* all checks are ok */
}
#endif
static int ssl_get_server_cert_index(const SSL *s)
{
int idx;
idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC && !s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509)
idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
if (idx == -1)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_CERT_INDEX, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return idx;
}
CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s)
{
CERT *c;
int i;
c = s->cert;
if (!s->s3 || !s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
return NULL;
ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
/*
* Broken protocol test: return last used certificate: which may mismatch
* the one expected.
*/
if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
return c->key;
#endif
i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s);
/* This may or may not be an error. */
if (i < 0)
return NULL;
/* May be NULL. */
return &c->pkeys[i];
}
EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
const EVP_MD **pmd)
{
unsigned long alg_a;
CERT *c;
int idx = -1;
alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
c = s->cert;
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
/*
* Broken protocol test: use last key: which may mismatch the one
* expected.
*/
if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
idx = c->key - c->pkeys;
else
#endif
if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) {
if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
} else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
if (idx == -1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return (NULL);
}
if (pmd)
*pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest;
return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL *s, const unsigned char **serverinfo,
size_t *serverinfo_length)
{
CERT *c = NULL;
int i = 0;
*serverinfo_length = 0;
c = s->cert;
i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s);
if (i == -1)
return 0;
if (c->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL)
return 0;
*serverinfo = c->pkeys[i].serverinfo;
*serverinfo_length = c->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length;
return 1;
}
#endif
void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode)
{
int i;
/*
* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it
* would be rather hard to do anyway :-)
*/
if (s->session->session_id_length == 0)
return;
i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
&& ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
|| SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session))
&& (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) {
CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s, s->session))
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
}
/* auto flush every 255 connections */
if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) {
if ((((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
? s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
: s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) {
SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx, (unsigned long)time(NULL));
}
}
}
const SSL_METHOD *SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->method;
}
const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
{
return (s->method);
}
int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
{
int conn = -1;
int ret = 1;
if (s->method != meth) {
if (s->handshake_func != NULL)
conn = (s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect);
if (s->method->version == meth->version)
s->method = meth;
else {
s->method->ssl_free(s);
s->method = meth;
ret = s->method->ssl_new(s);
}
if (conn == 1)
s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_connect;
else if (conn == 0)
s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_accept;
}
return (ret);
}
int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i)
{
int reason;
unsigned long l;
BIO *bio;
if (i > 0)
return (SSL_ERROR_NONE);
/*
* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc,
* where we do encode the error
*/
if ((l = ERR_peek_error()) != 0) {
if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS)
return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
else
return (SSL_ERROR_SSL);
}
if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s)) {
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
if (BIO_should_read(bio))
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
/*
* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write
* to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio
* are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for.
* However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have
* SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and
* wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so it
* might be safer to keep it.
*/
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
else
return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
}
}
if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s)) {
bio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
if (BIO_should_write(bio))
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
/*
* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio))
*/
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
else
return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
}
}
if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) {
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
}
if (i == 0) {
if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) {
/* assume it is the socket being closed */
return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
} else {
if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
(s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
}
}
return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
}
int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s)
{
int ret = 1;
if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
return (-1);
}
s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s);
if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
ret = s->handshake_func(s);
}
return (ret);
}
/*
* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so one of these
* calls will reset it
*/
void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s)
{
s->server = 1;
s->shutdown = 0;
s->state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT | SSL_ST_BEFORE;
s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept;
/* clear the current cipher */
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
}
void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s)
{
s->server = 0;
s->shutdown = 0;
s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT | SSL_ST_BEFORE;
s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect;
/* clear the current cipher */
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
}
int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return (0);
}
int ssl_undefined_void_function(void)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return (0);
}
int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return (0);
}
SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return (NULL);
}
const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
return ("TLSv1.2");
else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return ("TLSv1.1");
else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
return ("TLSv1");
else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
return ("SSLv3");
else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
return ("SSLv2");
else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
return ("DTLSv0.9");
else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
return ("DTLSv1");
else if (s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION)
return ("DTLSv1.2");
else
return ("unknown");
}
SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
{
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
X509_NAME *xn;
SSL *ret;
int i;
if ((ret = SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
return (NULL);
ret->version = s->version;
ret->type = s->type;
ret->method = s->method;
if (s->session != NULL) {
/* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */
SSL_copy_session_id(ret, s);
} else {
/*
* No session has been established yet, so we have to expect that
* s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- they should not both
* point to the same object, and thus we can't use
* SSL_copy_session_id.
*/
ret->method->ssl_free(ret);
ret->method = s->method;
ret->method->ssl_new(ret);
if (s->cert != NULL) {
if (ret->cert != NULL) {
ssl_cert_free(ret->cert);
}
ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert);
if (ret->cert == NULL)
goto err;
}
SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
}
ret->options = s->options;
ret->mode = s->mode;
SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
SSL_set_read_ahead(ret, SSL_get_read_ahead(s));
ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback;
ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg;
SSL_set_verify(ret, SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s));
SSL_set_verify_depth(ret, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id;
SSL_set_info_callback(ret, SSL_get_info_callback(s));
ret->debug = s->debug;
/* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */
if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data))
goto err;
/* setup rbio, and wbio */
if (s->rbio != NULL) {
if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio, (char *)&ret->rbio))
goto err;
}
if (s->wbio != NULL) {
if (s->wbio != s->rbio) {
if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio, (char *)&ret->wbio))
goto err;
} else
ret->wbio = ret->rbio;
}
ret->rwstate = s->rwstate;
ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake;
ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func;
ret->server = s->server;
ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate;
ret->new_session = s->new_session;
ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown;
ret->shutdown = s->shutdown;
ret->state = s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state,
* though */
ret->rstate = s->rstate;
ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf,
* ret->init_msg, ret->init_num,
* ret->init_off */
ret->hit = s->hit;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param);
/* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */
if (s->cipher_list != NULL) {
if ((ret->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL)
goto err;
}
if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id))
== NULL)
goto err;
/* Dup the client_CA list */
if (s->client_CA != NULL) {
if ((sk = sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL)
goto err;
ret->client_CA = sk;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk, i, X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL) {
X509_NAME_free(xn);
goto err;
}
}
}
if (0) {
err:
if (ret != NULL)
SSL_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
return (ret);
}
void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
{
if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
s->enc_read_ctx = NULL;
}
if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (s->expand != NULL) {
COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
s->expand = NULL;
}
if (s->compress != NULL) {
COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
s->compress = NULL;
}
#endif
}
X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->cert != NULL)
return (s->cert->key->x509);
else
return (NULL);
}
EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->cert != NULL)
return (s->cert->key->privatekey);
else
return (NULL);
}
X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx->cert != NULL)
return ctx->cert->key->x509;
else
return NULL;
}
EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx->cert != NULL)
return ctx->cert->key->privatekey;
else
return NULL;
}
const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
{
if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
return (s->session->cipher);
return (NULL);
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
{
return NULL;
}
const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
{
return NULL;
}
#else
const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
{
if (s->compress != NULL)
return (s->compress->meth);
return (NULL);
}
const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
{
if (s->expand != NULL)
return (s->expand->meth);
return (NULL);
}
#endif
int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push)
{
BIO *bbio;
if (s->bbio == NULL) {
bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
if (bbio == NULL)
return (0);
s->bbio = bbio;
} else {
bbio = s->bbio;
if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
}
(void)BIO_reset(bbio);
/* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */
if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return (0);
}
if (push) {
if (s->wbio != bbio)
s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio);
} else {
if (s->wbio == bbio)
s->wbio = BIO_pop(bbio);
}
return (1);
}
void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
{
if (s->bbio == NULL)
return;
if (s->bbio == s->wbio) {
/* remove buffering */
s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids
* adding one more preprocessor symbol */
assert(s->wbio != NULL);
#endif
}
BIO_free(s->bbio);
s->bbio = NULL;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode)
{
ctx->quiet_shutdown = mode;
}
int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return (ctx->quiet_shutdown);
}
void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode)
{
s->quiet_shutdown = mode;
}
int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s)
{
return (s->quiet_shutdown);
}
void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode)
{
s->shutdown = mode;
}
int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s)
{
return (s->shutdown);
}
int SSL_version(const SSL *s)
{
return (s->version);
}
SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
{
return (ssl->ctx);
}
SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
CERT *ocert = ssl->cert;
if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
return ssl->ctx;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (ctx == NULL)
ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
#endif
ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
if (ocert) {
int i;
/* Preserve any already negotiated parameters */
if (ssl->server) {
ssl->cert->peer_sigalgs = ocert->peer_sigalgs;
ssl->cert->peer_sigalgslen = ocert->peer_sigalgslen;
ocert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
ssl->cert->ciphers_raw = ocert->ciphers_raw;
ssl->cert->ciphers_rawlen = ocert->ciphers_rawlen;
ocert->ciphers_raw = NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
ssl->cert->pkeys[i].digest = ocert->pkeys[i].digest;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
ssl->cert->alpn_proposed = ocert->alpn_proposed;
ssl->cert->alpn_proposed_len = ocert->alpn_proposed_len;
ocert->alpn_proposed = NULL;
ssl->cert->alpn_sent = ocert->alpn_sent;
if (!custom_exts_copy_flags(&ssl->cert->srv_ext, &ocert->srv_ext))
return NULL;
#endif
ssl_cert_free(ocert);
}
/*
* Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH),
* so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system.
*/
OPENSSL_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
/*
* If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX,
* inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does
* not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context),
* leave it unchanged.
*/
if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) &&
(ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) &&
(memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0)) {
ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
}
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
ssl->ctx = ctx;
return (ssl->ctx);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return (X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store));
}
int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
const char *CApath)
{
return (X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, CAfile, CApath));
}
#endif
void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val))
{
ssl->info_callback = cb;
}
/*
* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned function
* pointer.
*/
void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL * /* ssl */ ,
int /* type */ ,
int /* val */ ) {
return ssl->info_callback;
}
int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl)
{
return (ssl->state);
}
void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state)
{
ssl->state = state;
}
void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long arg)
{
ssl->verify_result = arg;
}
long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl)
{
return (ssl->verify_result);
}
int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp,
new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg)
{
return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
}
void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx)
{
return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
}
int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp,
new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg)
{
return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
}
void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx)
{
return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
}
int ssl_ok(SSL *s)
{
return (1);
}
X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return (ctx->cert_store);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store)
{
if (ctx->cert_store != NULL)
X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
ctx->cert_store = store;
}
int SSL_want(const SSL *s)
{
return (s->rwstate);
}
/**
* \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys.
* \param ctx the SSL context.
* \param cb the callback
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl,
int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb);
}
void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl,
int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb);
}
#endif
#ifdef DOXYGEN
/**
* \brief The RSA temporary key callback function.
* \param ssl the SSL session.
* \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite.
* \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size
* of the required key in bits.
* \return the temporary RSA key.
* \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback
*/
RSA *cb(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)
{
}
#endif
/**
* \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys.
* \param ctx the SSL context.
* \param dh the callback
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh);
}
void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,
(void (*)(void))ecdh);
}
void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,
EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB, (void (*)(void))ecdh);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
{
if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
if (identity_hint != NULL) {
ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
return 0;
} else
ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
return 1;
}
int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
{
if (s == NULL)
return 0;
if (s->session == NULL)
return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */
if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
if (identity_hint != NULL) {
s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
return 0;
} else
s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
return 1;
}
const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s)
{
if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
return NULL;
return (s->session->psk_identity_hint);
}
const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s)
{
if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
return NULL;
return (s->session->psk_identity);
}
void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s,
unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
const char *hint,
char *identity,
unsigned int
max_identity_len,
unsigned char *psk,
unsigned int
max_psk_len))
{
s->psk_client_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
const char *hint,
char *identity,
unsigned int
max_identity_len,
unsigned char *psk,
unsigned int
max_psk_len))
{
ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s,
unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
const char *identity,
unsigned char *psk,
unsigned int
max_psk_len))
{
s->psk_server_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
const char *identity,
unsigned char *psk,
unsigned int
max_psk_len))
{
ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
}
#endif
void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
int content_type, const void *buf,
size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
{
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
}
void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl,
void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
int content_type, const void *buf,
size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
{
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
}
/*
* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
* vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any.
* If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md Returns newly
* allocated ctx;
*/
EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md)
{
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
*hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
if (*hash == NULL || (md && EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL) <= 0)) {
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
*hash = NULL;
return NULL;
}
return *hash;
}
void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash)
{
if (*hash)
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
*hash = NULL;
}
void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug)
{
s->debug = debug;
}
int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s)
{
return s->hit;
}
int SSL_is_server(SSL *s)
{
return s->server;
}
#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
# include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c"
#endif
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink