85 lines
3.3 KiB
Desktop File
85 lines
3.3 KiB
Desktop File
# It's not recommended to modify this file in-place, because it will be
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# overwritten during upgrades. If you want to customize, the best
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# way is to use the "systemctl edit" command to create an override unit.
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#
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# For example, to pass additional options, create an override unit
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# (as is done by systemctl edit) and enter the following:
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#
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# [Service]
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# Environment=OPTIONS="-l 127.0.0.1,::1"
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[Unit]
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Description=IPX Network Config
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After=network.target
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[Service]
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EnvironmentFile=/etc/conf.d/ipx
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ExecStart=/usr/bin/memcached -p ${PORT} -u ${USER} -m ${CACHESIZE} -c ${MAXCONN} $OPTIONS
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# Set up a new file system namespace and mounts private /tmp and /var/tmp
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# directories so this service cannot access the global directories and
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# other processes cannot access this service's directories.
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PrivateTmp=true
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# Mounts the /usr, /boot, and /etc directories read-only for processes
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# invoked by this unit.
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ProtectSystem=full
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# Ensures that the service process and all its children can never gain new
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# privileges
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NoNewPrivileges=true
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# Sets up a new /dev namespace for the executed processes and only adds API
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# pseudo devices such as /dev/null, /dev/zero or /dev/random (as well as
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# the pseudo TTY subsystem) to it, but no physical devices such as /dev/sda.
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PrivateDevices=true
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# Required for dropping privileges and running as a different user
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CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_SETGID CAP_SETUID CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
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# Restricts the set of socket address families accessible to the processes
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# of this unit. Protects against vulnerabilities such as CVE-2016-8655
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RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX
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# Some security features are not in the older versions of systemd used by
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# e.g. RHEL7/CentOS 7. The below settings are automatically edited at package
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# build time to uncomment them if the target platform supports them.
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# Attempts to create memory mappings that are writable and executable at
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# the same time, or to change existing memory mappings to become executable
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# are prohibited.
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##safer##MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
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# Explicit module loading will be denied. This allows to turn off module
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# load and unload operations on modular kernels. It is recommended to turn
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# this on for most services that do not need special file systems or extra
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# kernel modules to work.
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##safer##ProtectKernelModules=true
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# Kernel variables accessible through /proc/sys, /sys, /proc/sysrq-trigger,
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# /proc/latency_stats, /proc/acpi, /proc/timer_stats, /proc/fs and /proc/irq
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# will be made read-only to all processes of the unit. Usually, tunable
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# kernel variables should only be written at boot-time, with the sysctl.d(5)
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# mechanism. Almost no services need to write to these at runtime; it is hence
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# recommended to turn this on for most services.
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##safer##ProtectKernelTunables=true
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# The Linux Control Groups (cgroups(7)) hierarchies accessible through
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# /sys/fs/cgroup will be made read-only to all processes of the unit.
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# Except for container managers no services should require write access
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# to the control groups hierarchies; it is hence recommended to turn this
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# on for most services
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##safer##ProtectControlGroups=true
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# Any attempts to enable realtime scheduling in a process of the unit are
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# refused.
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##safer##RestrictRealtime=true
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# Takes away the ability to create or manage any kind of namespace
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##safer##RestrictNamespaces=true
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[Install]
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WantedBy=multi-user.target
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