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linamh/net-mail/mailman/files/mailman-2.1.9-fix-XSS.patch
geos_one f9b0a1af5a add mailman 
git-svn-id: https://svn.disconnected-by-peer.at/svn/linamh/trunk/linamh@832 6952d904-891a-0410-993b-d76249ca496b
2009-02-26 21:04:19 +00:00

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=== modified file 'Mailman/Cgi/edithtml.py'
--- Mailman/Cgi/edithtml.py 2006-08-30 14:54:22 +0000
+++ Mailman/Cgi/edithtml.py 2007-12-04 19:52:18 +0000
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Copyright (C) 1998-2006 by the Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# Copyright (C) 1998-2007 by the Free Software Foundation, Inc.
#
# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
# modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -159,7 +159,20 @@
doc.AddItem('<hr>')
return
code = cgi_info['html_code'].value
- code = re.sub(r'<([/]?script.*?)>', r'&lt;\1&gt;', code)
+ if Utils.suspiciousHTML(code):
+ doc.AddItem(Header(3,
+ _("""The page you saved contains suspicious HTML that could
+potentially expose your users to cross-site scripting attacks. This change
+has therefore been rejected. If you still want to make these changes, you
+must have shell access to your Mailman server.
+ """)))
+ doc.AddItem(_('See '))
+ doc.AddItem(Link(
+'http://www.python.org/cgi-bin/faqw-mm.py?req=show&file=faq04.048.htp',
+ _('FAQ 4.48.')))
+ doc.AddItem(Header(3,_("Page Unchanged.")))
+ doc.AddItem('<hr>')
+ return
langdir = os.path.join(mlist.fullpath(), mlist.preferred_language)
# Make sure the directory exists
omask = os.umask(0)
=== modified file 'Mailman/Gui/General.py'
--- Mailman/Gui/General.py 2006-08-30 14:54:22 +0000
+++ Mailman/Gui/General.py 2007-12-04 19:52:18 +0000
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Copyright (C) 2001-2006 by the Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# Copyright (C) 2001-2007 by the Free Software Foundation, Inc.
#
# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
# modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -436,17 +442,21 @@
# Convert any html entities to Unicode
mlist.subject_prefix = Utils.canonstr(
val, mlist.preferred_language)
+ elif property == 'info':
+ if val <> mlist.info:
+ if Utils.suspiciousHTML(val):
+ doc.addError(_("""The <b>info</b> attribute you saved
+contains suspicious HTML that could potentially expose your users to cross-site
+scripting attacks. This change has therefore been rejected. If you still want
+to make these changes, you must have shell access to your Mailman server.
+This change can be made with bin/withlist or with bin/config_list by setting
+mlist.info.
+ """))
+ else:
+ mlist.info = val
else:
GUIBase._setValue(self, mlist, property, val, doc)
- def _escape(self, property, value):
- # The 'info' property allows HTML, but let's sanitize it to avoid XSS
- # exploits. Everything else should be fully escaped.
- if property <> 'info':
- return GUIBase._escape(self, property, value)
- # Sanitize <script> and </script> tags but nothing else. Not the best
- # solution, but expedient.
- return re.sub(r'(?i)<([/]?script.*?)>', r'&lt;\1&gt;', value)
def _postValidate(self, mlist, doc):
if not mlist.reply_to_address.strip() and \
=== modified file 'Mailman/Gui/GUIBase.py'
--- Mailman/Gui/GUIBase.py 2005-08-27 01:40:17 +0000
+++ Mailman/Gui/GUIBase.py 2007-11-18 20:01:26 +0000
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Copyright (C) 2002-2004 by the Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# Copyright (C) 2002-2007 by the Free Software Foundation, Inc.
#
# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
# modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
-# Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.
+# Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+# USA.
"""Base class for all web GUI components."""
@@ -122,10 +127,6 @@
# Validate all the attributes for this category
pass
- def _escape(self, property, value):
- value = value.replace('<', '&lt;')
- return value
-
def handleForm(self, mlist, category, subcat, cgidata, doc):
for item in self.GetConfigInfo(mlist, category, subcat):
# Skip descriptions and legacy non-attributes
@@ -144,10 +145,9 @@
elif not cgidata.has_key(property):
continue
elif isinstance(cgidata[property], ListType):
- val = [self._escape(property, x.value)
- for x in cgidata[property]]
+ val = [x.value for x in cgidata[property]]
else:
- val = self._escape(property, cgidata[property].value)
+ val = cgidata[property].value
# Coerce the value to the expected type, raising exceptions if the
# value is invalid.
try:
=== modified file 'Mailman/Utils.py'
--- Mailman/Utils.py 2007-11-25 08:04:30 +0000
+++ Mailman/Utils.py 2007-12-04 19:52:18 +0000
@@ -876,3 +876,154 @@
except (LookupError, UnicodeError, ValueError, HeaderParseError):
# possibly charset problem. return with undecoded string in one line.
return EMPTYSTRING.join(s.splitlines())
+
+
+# Patterns and functions to flag possible XSS attacks in HTML.
+# This list is compiled from information at http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html,
+# http://www.quirksmode.org/js/events_compinfo.html,
+# http://www.htmlref.com/reference/appa/events1.htm,
+# http://lxr.mozilla.org/mozilla/source/content/events/src/nsDOMEvent.cpp#59,
+# http://www.w3.org/TR/DOM-Level-2-Events/events.html and
+# http://www.xulplanet.com/references/elemref/ref_EventHandlers.html
+# Many thanks are due to Moritz Naumann for his assistance with this.
+_badwords = [
+ '<i?frame',
+ '<link',
+ '<meta',
+ '<script',
+ r'(?:^|\W)j(?:ava)?script(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)vbs(?:cript)?(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)domactivate(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)domattrmodified(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)domcharacterdatamodified(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)domfocus(?:in|out)(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)dommenuitem(?:in)?active(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)dommousescroll(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)domnodeinserted(?:intodocument)?(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)domnoderemoved(?:fromdocument)?(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)domsubtreemodified(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)fscommand(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onabort(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)on(?:de)?activate(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)on(?:after|before)print(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)on(?:after|before)update(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onbefore(?:(?:de)?activate|copy|cut|editfocus|paste)(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onbeforeunload(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onbegin(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onblur(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onbounce(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onbroadcast(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)on(?:cell)?change(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)oncheckboxstatechange(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)on(?:dbl)?click(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onclose(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)oncommand(?:update)?(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)oncomposition(?:end|start)(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)oncontextmenu(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)oncontrolselect(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)oncopy(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)oncut(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)ondataavailable(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)ondataset(?:changed|complete)(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)ondrag(?:drop|end|enter|exit|gesture|leave|over)?(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)ondragstart(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)ondrop(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onend(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onerror(?:update)?(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onfilterchange(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onfinish(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onfocus(?:in|out)?(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onhelp(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)oninput(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onkey(?:up|down|press)(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onlayoutcomplete(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)on(?:un)?load(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onlosecapture(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onmedia(?:complete|error)(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onmouse(?:down|enter|leave|move|out|over|up|wheel)(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onmove(?:end|start)?(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)on(?:off|on)line(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onoutofsync(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onoverflow(?:changed)?(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onpage(?:hide|show)(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onpaint(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onpaste(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onpause(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onpopup(?:hidden|hiding|showing|shown)(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onprogress(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onpropertychange(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onradiostatechange(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onreadystatechange(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onrepeat(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onreset(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onresize(?:end|start)?(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onresume(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onreverse(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onrow(?:delete|enter|exit|inserted)(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onrows(?:delete|enter|inserted)(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onscroll(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onseek(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onselect(?:start)?(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onselectionchange(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onstart(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onstop(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onsubmit(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onsync(?:from|to)preference(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onsyncrestored(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)ontext(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)ontimeerror(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)ontrackchange(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onunderflow(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)onurlflip(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)seeksegmenttime(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)svgabort(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)svgerror(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)svgload(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)svgresize(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)svgscroll(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)svgunload(?:\W|$)',
+ r'(?:^|\W)svgzoom(?:\W|$)',
+ ]
+
+
+# This is the actual re to look for the above patterns
+_badhtml = re.compile('|'.join(_badwords), re.IGNORECASE)
+# This is used to filter non-printable us-ascii characters, some of which
+# can be used to break words to avoid recognition.
+_filterchars = re.compile('[\000-\011\013\014\016-\037\177-\237]')
+# This is used to recognize '&#' and '%xx' strings for _translate which
+# translates them to characters
+_encodedchars = re.compile('(&#[0-9]+;?)|(&#x[0-9a-f]+;?)|(%[0-9a-f]{2})',
+ re.IGNORECASE)
+
+
+def _translate(mo):
+ """Translate &#... and %xx encodings into the encoded character."""
+ match = mo.group().lower().strip('&#;')
+ try:
+ if match.startswith('x') or match.startswith('%'):
+ val = int(match[1:], 16)
+ else:
+ val = int(match, 10)
+ except ValueError:
+ return ''
+ if val < 256:
+ return chr(val)
+ else:
+ return ''
+
+
+def suspiciousHTML(html):
+ """Check HTML string for various tags, script language names and
+ 'onxxx' actions that can be used in XSS attacks.
+ Currently, this a very simple minded test. It just looks for
+ patterns without analyzing context. Thus, it potentially flags lots
+ of benign stuff.
+ Returns True if anything suspicious found, False otherwise.
+ """
+
+ if _badhtml.search(_filterchars.sub(
+ '', _encodedchars.sub(_translate, html))):
+ return True
+ else:
+ return False
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